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Financial globalization offers both risks and benefits for countries of the semi-periphery or 
the so-called "emerging markets". Politics within the national space matters, yet acquires a 
new meaning, in the age of financial globalization. “Weak democracies" are characterized by 
limited accountability and transparency of the state and other key political institutions. Such 
democracies tend to suffer from populist cycles, which result in low capacity to carry out 
economic reform. Financial globalization, in turn, magnifies populist cycles and renders their 
consequences more severe. Hence "weak democracies" are confronted with the 
predominantly negative side of financial globalization which includes over-dependence on 
short-term capital flows, speculative attacks and recurrent financial crises leading to slow 
growth and a more regressive income distributional profile. The relevance of these set of 
propositions are illustrated with reference to the case of Turkey which, indeed, experienced 
recurrent financial crises in the post-capital account liberalization era with costly 
consequences for the real economy. Two general conclusions follow. Firstly, there is a need 
to strengthen democracy in the developing world.  Secondly, since this is hard to accomplish 
over a short space of time serious question marks are raised concerning the desirability of 
early exposure to financial globalization given the current state of the world. 
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Introduction 
The recent wave of financial globalization constitutes a striking development of the late 
twentieth century. Yet, financial globalization has been extremely uneven in terms of its 
impact. The major beneficiaries of this process have been developed countries and a limited 
number of the advanced middle-income economies or the so-called emerging markets.
1 Even 
within the emerging market category, we observe a differentiation with a limited subset of 
countries claiming a disproportionate share of capital flows.
2 The process of financial 
globalization is a double-edged phenomenon; it carries significant risks and as well as 
offering major benefits for the capital receiving countries. The risk element is clearly evident 
from the highly volatile nature of these flows and the series of financial crises primarily, if 
not exclusively, in the semi-periphery of the world economy during the last decade.
3 At the 
same time however, there is a major potential benefit embodied by the process of financial 
globalization, in the sense that access to cheaper capital facilitates a higher rate of economic 
growth than otherwise would be the case.
4  
 
The ability to benefit from financial globalization differs significantly from one country to 
another and hence, it is an endogenously determined process. Domestic "institutional and 
political capacities" of individual states perform a critical role in their ability to reap the 
benefits from financial flows. An interesting question in this context concerns the link 
between the "nature" or "quality" of democracy, on the one hand, and the question of 
"institutional and political capacity", on the other. The interaction between financial 
                                                        
1 For evidence on the uneven distribution of the capital flows in the global economy with developed countries 
and emerging market economies, emerging markets being the major beneficiaries from this process, see 
UNCTAD (1999). 
2 For evidence in terms of the uneven distribution of the capital flows among the emerging market economies 
themselves, see UNCTAD (1999).  
3 For detailed evidence on the general characteristics and individual instances of crises in emerging market 
economies, see Kahler (1998). 
4 On benefits of financial globalization, in terms of access to external resources at lower interest rates and hence 
the ability to achieve higher rates of economic growth see World Bank (1997).    2
globalization and political regimes in general and "democracy" in particular has attracted 
significant attention in recent years.
5 It is fair to argue, however, that the primary emphasis in 
the literature has been on the issue of how financial globalization itself has shaped the 
democratization process in countries undergoing a transition from authoritarian rule and 
created new political openings. In the present context, our emphasis will be not on the causal 
link running from financial globalization to democracy but the reverse. Our objective is to 
demonstrate in a case study framework that a regime of "imperfect democracy" or a country's 
"democratic deficits" may significantly undermine its political and institutional capacity, 
which in turn prevents it from fully capitalizing on the benefits of the financial globalization.   
 
Within this broad framework, our primary focus will be on the Turkish experience. The 
origins of Turkey's neo-liberal experiment may be traced back to 1980. However, the critical 
turning point came in August 1989, which marked the date of full capital account 
liberalization.
6 From that point onwards, Turkey has been exposed to the vagaries of financial 
globalization, which has produced two major crises in the post 1990 era, a development, 
which makes a sharp contrast with the crisis free era of the initial phase of reforms in the 
1980s. Indeed, the combined effect of these successive crises has been to reduce the average 
growth rate of the Turkish economy in the 1990s relative to the previous decade.
7 If August 
1989 represented the key turning point of the Turkish economy, the referendum of September 
1987 marked a return to "full democracy". The return to democracy and the nature of 
democratic politics, which emerged in the context of 1990s, had far reaching implications for 
Turkey's ability to sustain fiscal equilibrium and governmental accountability. In retrospect, 
                                                        
5 For a useful study, which focuses on the causal link running from financial globalization to democratization 
itself, see Armijo (1999) 
6 For a detailed documentation of Turkey's neo-liberal experiment, see Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), Onis (1998), 
Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan (2000), and Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001).  
7 For evidence on the differential performance of the Turkish economy during the two decades of the Neo-
liberal reforms with inferior growth performance recorded during the 1990s, see Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001).    3
Turkey's inherent democratic deficits closely contributed to the emergence of successive 
crises and helped to create a lopsided structure of heavy dependence on short-term and 
volatile capital flows. This created a highly fragile balance of payments structure in which 
large current account deficits have been disguised by inflows of short-term capital. Lack of 
democratic accountability was also at the hearth of the process of perverse functioning of the 
financial sector in the post liberalization era. In fact, this has been another striking element in 
the creation of financial crises in the recent era. One could go even further and argue that it 
has been the primary influence in the outbreak of the most recent crises in 2000 and 2001. 
Hence politics matters in the era of financial globalization and our principal objective is to 
demonstrate the precise links or mechanisms whereby politics contributes to the economic 
consequences of financial globalization.  
 
Turning our attention to the specifics of the political sphere, Turkey may be classified as a 
case of a fragile or weak "second wave" democracy.
8 Multi-party democracy in Turkey 
effectively dates back to 1950. The democratic regime in Turkey, in spite of its considerable 
longevity however, has been characterized by periodic breakdowns followed by periods of 
military rule.
9 In broad terms, the Turkish democracy tends to exhibit some of the 
characteristics associated with the term "delegative democracy", a term coined by Guillermo 
O'Donnell (1994) to highlight some of the salient characteristics of the Latin American 
democracies. The components of delegative democracy, which seems to apply best to Turkish 
case, include the presence of political parties dominated by an "all-powerful" leader, 
significant continuity of leadership, the relative absence of intra-party democracy and 
electoral support based on clientelistic ties and populist redistributive politics. Indeed the 
                                                        
8 On different waves of democratization and the characteristics of second and third wave democracies, see 
Huntington (1991). Representative democracy in Turkey effectively dates back to 1950.   4
primary motivation of political parties in Turkey seems to be to distribute public rents to their 
own supporters. This observation also draws attention to a paradoxical aspect of party 
leadership in the Turkish context. Whilst the party leaders tend to be strong and their power 
relatively unchallenged, their survival, nonetheless, depends critically on their ability to 
practice patronage politics and to maintain a certain base of electoral support.  
 
What tends to differentiate Turkish democracy from its Latin American variants is the 
dominance of parliamentary traditions in the former case and the prevalence of presidential 
styles of governments in the latter. However, elements, which are common to both cases 
include polities characterized by leader domination, the absence of checks and balances, 
pervasive lack of accountability and a lack of emphasis on the rule of law.
10 The deficits of 
delegative democracies in turn have far reaching repercussions especially in an environment 
of financial openness.  Excessive uncertainty, short horizons for policy makers, and inherent 
vulnerability to mis-utilization of public funds and periodic crises constitute the typical 
consequences of such deficits. Furthermore, in spite of their populist claims, these types of 
democracies tend to be associated with persistently high and indeed increasing rates of 
income inequality. Judged by the standards of advanced democracies of the West, Latin 
American style imperfect democracies tend to be typically associated with a distorted pattern 
of market based development with the two phenomena reinforcing one another. These 
distortions in turn prevent these economies from fully capitalising on the benefits of financial 
globalization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Periodic breakdowns of the democratic regime in Turkey occurred in 1960, 1970 and 1980. The military 
interludes have been relatively brief; but nevertheless, have far reaching repercussions on the Turkish political 
system. For detailed elaboration and evidence, see Ozbudun (2000). 
10 On the combination of imperfect democracy and imperfect market-based democracy in Latin America, see 
Oxhorn and Starr (1999).    5
Our broad argument linking the underlying democratic deficit to economic performance in 
the era of financial globalization requires a serious qualification, however, particularly in the 
recent Latin American context. Indeed, certain sub-components of the democratic deficit such 
as leader domination in political parties have been quite common in Latin American settings. 
Concentrated decision making, in turn, has been instrumental in bypassing populist pressures 
for redistribution and, hence, has contributed towards controlling government spending. The 
capacity to reduce budget deficits and inflation by a substantial margin in the Argentinean, 
Mexican and Peruvian cases during the late 1980s and the 1990s clearly testify the validity of 
this proposition. The conversion of "neo-populist" leaders such as Carlos Menem in 
Argentina or Alberto Fujimoro in Peru to "neo-liberal" reformers constitutes one of the 
striking and paradoxical tendencies in Latin American political economies in recent 
decades.
11 Without wishing to probe into the complex dynamics underlying this phenomenon, 
we wish to emphasize that "leader domination" and lack of intra-party democracy may be 
compatible with far-reaching economic reforms. 
 
1. Fragile Democratic Politics and Origins of Premature Capital Account 
Liberalization in Turkey 
 
Considering the drastic ramifications and the ex-ante risks involved, an interesting question 
for interpretation concerns the timing of the capital account liberalization in Turkey in 
August 1989. Many commentators have argued that the decision to open up the capital 
account was premature given the prevailing macroeconomic and political instability in 
Turkey.
12 In retrospect, one can recognize a certain political logic underlying this decision, 
                                                        
11  For a detailed elaboration of this issue, see Roberts (1995). 
12 On the premature nature of the capital account liberalization, see Rodrik (1990) and Cizre-Sakallioglu and 
Yeldan (2000). Discontinuity in Turkish politics clearly manifests itself during the local elections of March 
1999, with the ruling party ANAP experiencing a striking decline in its share of the vote from 36% to 21%.   6
which may help to resolve the apparent paradox. The local elections of March 1989 
represented a critical turning point in Turkey's political trajectory. The ruling Motherland 
Party (ANAP), which, under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, had emerged as an outright 
winner in the general elections of both November 1983 and November 1987, experienced a 
drastic decline in its popularity in the municipal elections of March 1999.
13 The process of 
early capital account liberalization, in turn, may be regarded as a reaction on the part of Ozal 
to regain popularity and electoral support. In more concrete terms, the decision to open up the 
capital account may be explained in the following terms. Fundamental to the project of 
recovering the electoral fortunes of the party was an accelerated process of economic growth, 
improvement in employment prospects and drastic decline in inflation. Capital account 
liberalization in line with trade liberalization, at least in the short run, helped to achieve these 
objectives by attracting additional external capital generating an internal consumer boom 
through higher imports financed by these flows. Also part of this virtuous cycle was a 
domestic investment boom again facilitated by large inflows of external capital. Inflation 
control was aimed at through a mix of import discipline and real appreciation of Turkish Lira. 
Given the almost costless increase in the availability of international reserves, the unique 
emphasis on exports, which seemed to characterize the early stages of the neo-liberal 
program in the first half of the 1980s, was effectively discontinued.  
 
Attention ought to be drawn also to a possible economic logic underlying the premature 
capital account liberalization in 1989.
14 Starting in 1986, fiscal deficit displayed an 
expansionary course financed through domestic borrowing with a crowding out effect on 
private investment. Also relevant in this context is the growing financial autonomy granted to 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) and local administrations. In the absence of automatic 
                                                        
13 The increase in inflation in the late 1980s was a key factor underlying Ozal's loss of popularity. For evidence, 
see Onis and Webb (1994).   7
budgetary transfers to these institutions and the monetization of these transfers, the 
establishments concerned had to borrow from the domestic markets. This in turn raised the 
domestic interest rates and contributed to the crowding out of private investment. Both of 
these processes naturally created a need for additional funds to accelerate the pace of private 




2. The Perverse Outcome of the Capital Account Liberalization in a Fragile 
Democratic Polity: The Crisis of the 1994 
 
"Populist cycles" are not novel phenomenon in the Turkish economy.
15 A typical populist 
cycle is initiated by a period of fiscal expansionism designed to generate political support. 
Given the underlying electoral logic the emphasis is generally on the current expenditures, 
which have immediate positive repercussions on the current generation of voters. This 
process, which appears to offer tangible benefits in the short run, however, creates the seeds 
of its own destruction and embodies negative implications for medium-term economic 
performance. Fiscal expansionism in an environment of appreciating real exchange rates 
result in large current account deficits leading to a balance of payments or debt crisis and an 
inevitable encounter with the IMF. The IMF programs, in turn, are designed to restore fiscal 
and current account balance but tend to be costly in the short run in terms of their effects on 
output growth, employment and income distribution.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 On the timing and economic logic of capital account liberalization in Turkey, see Ersel (1996) 
15 For evidence on the initial two waves of populist cycles during the pre-neo-liberal era in the Turkish 
economy, see Onis and Riedel (1993)   8
The first two populist cycles that Turkey experienced in the late 1950s and the late 1970s 
occurred largely in an environment of fixed exchange rates and capital account controls. 
Hence current account was the dominant element of the balance of payments and capital 
flows were of marginal significance.  
 
The third populist cycle the Turkish economy experienced during the period 1987-1993 
leading to the crisis of 1994 embodied additional features, which made it fundamentally 
different from the two previous cycles. The third wave of fiscal expansionism occurred in an 
environment of capital account openness and managed or controlled flexibility of exchange 
rates. Rather paradoxically, short-term capital flows, which accompanied the process of 
capital account liberalization, contributed towards and helped to augment the dimensions of 
the populist cycle. Hence a highly fragile and unstable pattern emerged whereby the pace of 
fiscal expansionism became heavily dependent on highly volatile and reversible short-term 
capital inflows. The perverse outcome of capital account liberalization manifested itself in a 
striking fashion with the outbreak of the 1994 crisis reflecting the inability of policy makers 
to adjust themselves to the new environment.
16 The policy makers still continued to operate 
within the parameters of a closed economy model and tended to neglect the current account 
as an important source of disequilibrium on the assumption that capital flows would be 
irreversible and sustained on a steady course.  
 
In fact, the origins of the third populist cycle, or the very first cycle of the neo-liberal era, can 
be traced back to 1987. The early phase of stabilization and export orientation during the 
post-1980 era had negative consequences for two distinct groups in Turkish society, namely, 
wage earners and agricultural producers. These two important categories of "losers" were 
                                                        
16 For a characterization of the 1994 financial crisis, as a crisis of mismanagement, see Ozatay (1997).   9
progressively empowered as part of the political opening process in the 1983-1987 era and 
were in a position to recover the early losses that they had incurred.
17 Hence, an important 
component of the populist cycle, which manifested itself in the post-1987 era, reflected the 
growing influence of these two "numerically important" groups. Indeed the coalition 
government, formed in 1991, involving the right-of-centre True-Path Party (DYP) and the 
left-of-centre Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) could be considered as predominantly 
a representative of these two important segments of the Turkish society. It would be 
misleading to equate the emergence of populist cycles of the neo-liberal era purely with the 
distributional pressures from below. In fact, governments tried to distribute rents to both 
winners and losers of neo-liberal reforms in order to build broad-based electoral coalitions.
18  
 
A key characteristic of the political environment, which emerged after the local government 
elections of March 1999, is a highly fragmented political system with successive weak 
coalition governments. Coalition governments and non-concurrent elections do not 
necessarily imply instability in established democracies characterized by a high degree of 
accountability, a strong system of checks and balances and a political culture based on 
compromise and consensus. Hence, they should not be considered a component of the 
democratic deficit itself. In the Turkish context, however, given the underlying democratic 
deficits, these influences have tended to magnify instability even further. The fragmented 
nature of the party system tended to reduce the time horizon of governments and helped to 
intensify the populist cycle. The timing of elections in Turkey, with local government 
elections typically scheduled in between two general elections (at least up until 1999), could 
be considered as another disequilibrating influence. 
                                                        
17 Opening up of the political system involved the removal of restrictions over the bargaining rights of labor 
unions. See Onis and Webb (1994).   10
 
The dynamics of the post-1987 populist cycle are clearly evident from the dramatic increase 
in the share of public expenditures in GNP (Table 1).  
Table 1: Consolidated Budget Deficit and Its Components (% of GNP)  
   Current  Investments  Transfers  Primary  Budget Balance 
1981-1985  7.6  3.4  7.0  -1.4  -2.6 
1986-90  6.7  3.1  7.2  0.1  -3.2 
1991  9.5  2.7  8.3  -1.5  -5.3 
1992  10.3  2.6  7.1  -0.6  -4.3 
1993  10.3  2.7  11.4  -0.9  -6.7 
1994  8.9  1.9  12.3  3.8  -3.9 
1995  8.2  1.2  12.4  3.3  -4.0 
1996  8.6  1.6  16.2  1.7  -8.3 
1997  9.5  2.0  15.7  0.1  -7.6 
1998  9.7  1.9  17.6  4.6  -6.9 
1999  11.7  2.0  22.1  2.1  -11.6 
2000  10.8  2.0  24.2  6.0  -10.2 
Average  8.4  2.7  10.6  0.4  -4.7 
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Figure 1: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
(% of GNP)
 
Source: State Planning Organization 
                                                                                                                                                                            
18 Several instruments were used to compensate the winners including low-tax discipline, low-cost imported 
inputs due to the real appreciation of the exchange rate, and preferential access to credits extended by public   11
Within the public expenditures, the rise in current expenditures is striking, reflecting the 
impact of public sector wage booms, notably in 1989-1991. Yet another striking feature is the 
record PSBR/GNP figure established in 1993 just prior to the crisis (Figure 1). 
 
The perverse outcome of capital account liberalization in an environment characterized by a 
fragmented party system and populist cycles were distorted capital account structure. Turkey 
has been able to attract predominantly short-term capital flows, which are highly volatile in 
nature. In spite of the institution of a liberal foreign investment regime, the inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have remained marginal both with respect to other types of capital 




Table 2: Capital Flows: Magnitudes and Components 
  in Million USD  % of Total Flows 
  Capital Account  NET FDI  GROSS FDI  Net FDI  Gross FDI 
1992  3648  779  844  21.4  23.1 
1993  8963  622  636  6.9  7.1 
1994  -4194  559  608  NA  NA 
1995  4643  772  885  16.6  19.1 
1996  5555  612  722  11.0  13.0 
1997  7053  554  805  7.9  11.4 
1998  -755  573  940  NA  NA 
1999  4671  138  783  3.0  16.8 
2000  9445  112  982  1.2  10.4 
Total  39029  4721  7205  12.1  18.5 
Average  4337  525  801  12.1  18.5 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
banks. 
19 For evidence on the distribution of FDI flows, see UNCTAD (1999).   12
The crisis of 1994 was triggered by two proximate causes, namely, the government's attempt 
to control the interest rates as well as the level of the exchange rate in a high inflation 
environment and the lowering of Turkey's credit rating. Both of these causes would have 
been of marginal significance in a controlled capital account environment. The end result was 
a steady decline of the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank, ultimately leading to a 
successful speculative attack on Turkish Lira, generating a large devaluation necessitating yet 
another encounter with the IMF. 
 
 
3. The Repercussions of the 1994 Crisis: Longer-term Deterioration for the Sake of 
Short-Term Recovery 
 
The IMF program, introduced in April 1994, embodied many standard features associated 
with Fund programs. A mixture of expenditure reducing and expenditure switching policies 
were implemented during the course of the year.
20 As a consequence of these policies, there 
was a significant contraction of output and employment with GNP growth rate emerging 
negative in 1994. Exports recovered swiftly and the import boom was reversed with a 
consequent improvement in the current account balance. In retrospect, the Turkish economy 
managed to accomplish a smooth recovery from the crisis. By the beginning of 1995, the 
growth process was resumed (Table 3) with a consequent increase in short-term capital 
inflows (Table 2). 
 
 
                                                        
20  Expenditure reducing policies included monetary contraction, expenditure cuts particularly in the forms of 
transfers to SOEs, as well as current expenditures. Expenditure switching policies included devaluation as well 
as additional incentives to exporters in the form of Eximbank credits.   13
Table 3: Main Economic Indicators of Macroeconomic Performance 
  Real Growth  Per Capita Real Growth  Inflation  Debt/GNP 
1981-1985  4.7  2.1  40.0  36.3 
1986-90  5.8  3.5  54.4  49.1 
1991  0.3  -1.6  59.2  38.8 
1992  6.4  4.4  63.5  38.9 
1993  8.1  6.2  67.4  38.8 
1994  -6.1  -7.8  107.3  51.2 
1995  8.0  6.1  87.2  44.1 
1996  7.1  5.3  78.0  47.1 
1997  8.3  8.7  81.2  46.6 
1998  3.9  2.3  75.3  47.9 
1999  -6.1  -7.4  55.8  58.7 
2000  6.1  1.4  51.6  59.9 
Average  4.4  2.3  59.9  44.9 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the Treasury 
 
Part of the swift recovery process may be accounted by labour market flexibility and 
significant redistribution of income away from wage earners
21. We should also emphasize 
however that certain measures undertaken by the government have also contributed to the 
recovery process, yet this proved to be a distorted recovery, which effectively created the 
bases of the subsequent and the latest round of crises in the Turkish economy. Stated 
somewhat differently, short-term responses designed to achieve relatively costless recovery 
embodied negative repercussions from a longer- term perspective. Two specific ingredients 
of government policy deserve emphasis in this context. Firstly, the policy of keeping 
domestic interests high to encourage inflows of short-term capital and discourage outflows 
have resulted in a rapid build-up of domestic debt with devastating consequences in the late 
1990s. Secondly, banking sector regulations, notably full insurance coverage for deposit 
accounts, to provide breathing space for banks in the aftermath of the crisis have created 
                                                        
21 For evidence on labor market flexibility in Turkey and the decline of the wage share, see Senses  
(1994) and Ozmucur (1996) respectively.   14
moral hazard problems. Indeed, these banking regulations have constituted a considerable 
source of instability and have emerged as a key contributor to the latest wave of crises at the 
turn of a new century. 
 
The Turkish economy appeared to recover quite smoothly from the crisis of 1994. By the 
beginning of 1995, the growth process was resumed accompanied by a surge in exports, 
which in turn was facilitated by the depreciation of the exchange rate. The underlying 
confidence in the economy in general and in financial institutions in particular was also 
restored. As a consequence, the massive outflow of capital characterizing 1994 was reversed 
(Table 2). Turkey in the mid-1990s benefited from the broadly favorable financial 
environment, which was translated to a sustained movement in capital flows to emerging 
markets as a whole up until the Asian crisis of 1997. A closer inspection reveals however the 
superficial and fragile nature of the recovery in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 crisis. 
Fiscal disequilibrium continued to manifest itself as a fundamental source of instability, 
although in a modified form. Even though some reduction was achieved in the PSBR/GNP 
ratio in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 crisis -largely due to the reduction in the SEE 
deficits-, this did not prove to be a sustainable process (Figure 1). The overall budgetary 
deficit once again reached record levels by the end of the decade. The only difference was a 
change in the underlying components of the fiscal disequilibrium. A close inspection of the 
data reveals a steady increase in the share of transfer payments in budgetary expenditures in 
the latter half of the decade. This in turn is a reflection of the major increase in the interest 
burden on domestic public debt. The only element of continuity with the earlier era 
concerned the marginalization of public investment with potentially negative consequences 
                                                                                                                                                                            
         15
for future growth prospects. Indeed, one needs to recognize that official figures substantially 
underestimate the size of the budgetary deficit.
22   
 
Once again, a crucial link can be formulated between Turkey's democratic deficits and the 
resilience of fiscal disequilibrium. As in the earlier part of the decade, a fragmented party 
system and weak coalition governments continued to aggravate Turkey's democratic deficits. 
Successive governments in office continued to be motivated by myopic electoral concerns 
and in the absence of appropriate checks and balances, which are part and parcel of 
established democracies, failed to recognize the importance of fiscal discipline as a means of 
a sustainable debt burden. The result was magnifying the disequilibrium already built through 
the years.  
 
Governments in Turkey progressively resorted to extra budgetary means of financing 
government expenditures, a phenomenon, which can be considered a legacy of the Ozal era 
of the 1980s
23. The dimensions of fiscal disequilibrium in Turkey were amplified by the 
ability of the governments to disguise the true size of public expenditures and the scale of 
rent distribution. One can recognize here two key elements of the democratic deficit in 
Turkey namely, a pervasive lack of accountability and lack of transparency.  
 
The underlying lack of accountability and transparency also manifested itself in the form of 
deteriorating performance of the banking sector and the financial system. Public banks 
distributed credits often on non-economic criteria with the consequence that they incurred 
significant losses in real terms, which were concealed for a long time due to non-transparent 
                                                        
22 For evidence involving a severe underestimation of the size of the budget deficit in Turkey, see the report of 
Audit Court, Sayistay (2000) and Akcay et al. (2001). 
23  For a detailed analysis involving the origins of the extra budgetary funds in Turkey, see Oyan and Aydin 
(1987)   16
accounting procedures
24. Indeed the weakness of the banking sector in Turkey and endemic 
fiscal disequilibrium constituted interrelated phenomena. Public banks in general and notably 
the largest bank of the Turkish financial system as a whole, the State Agricultural Bank 
(Ziraat Bank), contributed to fiscal deficit
25. Indeed these two phenomena were at the hearth 
of the two consecutive sets of crises, which affected the Turkish economy at the turn of the 
new century. 
 
Bribery and corruption have been endemic features of the Turkish economy in the recent era. 
International evidence clearly places Turkey among the set of countries where the practice of 
corruption is perceived to be a significant phenomenon.
26 Finally, military expenditures 
constitute yet another sphere where accounting and transparency have been strikingly absent. 
The official estimate of the military expenditure GNP ratio is around 4.5 percent. This figure 
is high by international standards, yet many investigators consider this estimate to be a true 
understatement.
27 In fact, a close correspondence may be detected between the 
underestimation of the military expenditures and the unaccounted budget deficits in the 
Turkish context. 
 
4. The Financial Crises of 2000 and 2001: Inevitable and Endogenously Generated 
Phenomena? 
The IMF remained very much in the sidelines in the early years following the 1994 crisis. 
IMF continued to publish critical reports on the Turkish macroeconomic performance but its 
                                                        
24 For evidence on this issue see IMF (1998). On the disinflation program and its impact on the Turkish banking 
sector, see Alper et al (2001). 
25 On the mechanics of this process involving the linkages between Ziraat and public deficits, see Sayistay 
(2000). 
26 The corruption Perceptions Index 2001 (by Transparency International, 2001) ranked Turkey fifty-seventh out 
of ninety-one countries, the rank value increasing with the level of corruption. It is interesting that key emerging 
markets such as Argentina and Mexico are ranked broadly at the same level, emerging as the fifty-seventh and 
fifty-first respectively.  
27 See Gunluk-Senesen (2000).    17
influence was confined to an advisory role as long as there was no imminent danger of a 
financial crisis. By 1999, however, it became increasingly evident that Turkey was on an 
unsustainable course. The IMF had an obvious interest in pressurizing the Turkish 
government to adopt a radical anti-inflationary program based on fiscal austerity and related 
set of structural reforms. There was increasing recognition among the public at large within 
Turkey that populist redistribution was proving to be increasingly costly and inherently 
unsustainable. This was evidently clear from the unusually high and increasing share of 
interest payments on public debt within budgetary expenditures, leaving very limited 
resources for either populist redistribution or for growth oriented public investment. (Tables 1 
and 4)  
 
Table 4: Transfer Expenditures (% of GNP) 
  Interest Payments  Transfers to SOEs Other Transfers  Total 
1981-1985  1.4  1.7  3.6  6.7 
1986-90  3.3  0.5  3.4  7.2 
1991  3.8  1.9  2.6  8.3 
1992  3.7  0.7  2.7  7.1 
1993  5.8  1.3  4.3  11.4 
1994  7.7  0.5  4.1  12.3 
1995  7.3  0.6  4.5  12.4 
1996  10.0  0.3  5.8  16.2 
1997  7.7  0.4  7.6  15.7 
1998  11.5  0.3  5.7  17.6 
1999  13.7  0.5  7.9  22.1 
2000  16.2  0.7  7.3  24.2 
Average  5.6  0.9  4.4  10.6 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
 
The year 1999 also marked a turning point in Turkey's political trajectory. Up to 1999, 
coalition politics in Turkey had invariably signified instability and conflict. This appeared to 
be the case in both the late 1970s and the early and the mid-1990s. Following the combined   18
general and local elections of April 1999 however, the coalition government, which emerged, 
embodied certain features, which made it rather distinct from the earlier experiences. The 
three political parties, which formed the new coalition government, had very different 
ideological orientations. The dominant partners of the coalition were the left of centre "The 
Democratic Left Party" (DSP), and the radical nationalist 'National Action Party" (MHP) 
with the right of centre "Motherland Party" (ANAP) entering the coalition as a minor partner. 
In spite of the obvious ideological differences, the coalition government seemed to display a 
high degree of cohesion, which in turn generated considerable optimism both among the 
domestic and external actors regarding the prospects of implementing the far-reaching 
stabilization program of December 1999. A closer inspection revealed however that the two 
dominant parties, which made up the coalition, were essentially parties representing losers 
from the reform process with MHP drawing its electoral base predominantly from rural areas 
and DSP from the urban poor
28. Hence, in spite of the apparent cohesion among the coalition 
partners and commitment to reform, the parties concerned were reluctant to give up the old 
instruments of clientelistic politics and populist redistribution. Two striking examples of this 
tendency concern the resistance to the sale of Turkish Telekom and the reduction of 
agricultural support prices, both of which were integral to the success of the program. In both 
cases, MHP was the primary actor in resisting pressures for reform. While the consideration 
of whether these policies are desirability of these policies is beyond the scope of our present 
analysis, the key issue of concern for our purposes is that the government in question failed to 
maintain commitment to its initial promises. Hence its credibility was undermined leading to 
negative signals to both domestic and external actors, jeopardizing the very fortunes of the 
stabilization program. These observations point towards the resilience and inertial 
                                                        
28 For evidence on the electoral base of different political parties, see Carkoglu (2000).   19
characteristics of Turkey's democratic deficits, which have been at the hearth of the two 
consecutive crises at the turn of the century.  
 
In retrospect, it would be misleading to classify the 1999 program as a total failure. In fact, 
significant steps have been taken towards implementing certain key components of the 
program. Strong implementation was evident in the spheres of public sector wage and 
salaries, control over monetary aggregates, and measures to improve the structure of the 
consolidated budget as well as the performances of the SOEs. A closer investigation reveals, 
however, the reluctance of the policy makers to tackle the potentially more difficult and 
politically costly issues particularly in the area of banking sector regulation notably in the 
context of public banks. A striking example in this context concerns the failure to deal with 
the perennial problem of "duty losses" of SOEs in general public banks in particular. Indeed, 
the policy makers tackled the issue only after the collapse of the program in February 2001 
with costly consequences. The Treasury assumed responsibility for the duty losses of the 
public banks, amounting to US$ 20 billion, only after the crisis had materialized. This 
profound delay, in turn, led to a massive outflow of capital. The result was a sharp increase in 
interest rates due to a contraction of liquidity.
29 Given the fragile nature of the banking 
system
30 and its inability to shoulder the burden of high interest rates, the Central Bank had to 
give up its commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime, allowing the float of the currency 
which in effect meant a large devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Moving beyond these 
immediate consequences, the medium-term ramifications were also quite profound. The 
devaluation led to a jump in the inflation rate, reversing perhaps the principal success (at least 
                                                        
29 For a comprehensive analysis of the 2000 liquidity crisis in Turkey, see Alper (2001). Interbank overnight 
interest rates skyrocketed to a maximum of 6,200% on February 21, 2001 from the previous week's level of 
45%. This resulted in a massive devaluation on the following day. During 19-21 February 2001, the Central 
Bank had to sell USD 5 billion. For evidence see Central Bank (2001).   20
on a temporary basis), which nevertheless had been achieved in a rather costly manner. The 
heavy losses of the banking sector incurred during the crises, a natural outcome of the sharp 
increase in the interest rates, generated a credit crunch. Hence the increase in the interest rates 
was associated with negative consequences for the real economy in terms of contraction in 
output and rise in unemployment. This process also exercised a negative influence over 
budgetary balance. Contraction of output restricted the capacity to generate public revenues 
whereas high post-crisis interest rates aggravated the cost of financing the budget deficit. As 
a result, the issue of debt sustainability became a fundamental cause of concern in the design 
of the ensuing stabilization program of May 2001. 
 
Looking back to the latter half of the 1990s, Turkish economy's fortunes were negatively 
affected by external developments. Both the Asian Crisis of 1997 and the ensuing Russian 
Crisis of 1998 were significant for the growth trajectory of the Turkish economy. Given the 
growing significance of Russia as a trading partner, the Russian Crisis, through trade links 
embodied negative ramifications for Turkey's real economy. Perhaps more significantly, an 
environment characterized by successive financial crises, which were inherently contagious, 
and dominated by private capital flows rendered capital flows even more volatile and fragile. 
One has to recognize therefore that not only the task of stabilization, predicated on the 
availability of large private capital inflows, was rendered more difficult, but also the system 
was exposed to greater risks of speculative attacks and ensuing financial crisis. The 
implications of these policies for the performance of the real economy are quite profound as 
indicated by the close association, which seems to exist between ups and downs of growth 
and capital flows in the Turkish context during the post-capital account liberalization era 
(Figure 2). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
30 Banks in Turkey had been accustomed to living in a high inflation environment, which is clearly a consequent 
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Figure 2: Growth and Capital Flows in Turkey (1989-2000)
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
 
This brings us to our initial conjecture concerning the importance of politics in the era of 
financial globalization. Indeed, politics matters in a rather specific way to the process of 
sustainable capital inflows. It is increasingly recognized that sustainability of capital inflows 
is conditional upon the provision of a stream of good news emanating from politicians and 
policy makers. The logical corollary is that provision of bad news is costly. A clear example 
of this phenomenon is the conflict between President Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister 
Bulent Ecevit, which helped to trigger off the Crisis of 2001 with costly consequences. 
Whilst it would be misleading to attribute the crisis to this particular "incident", it 
nevertheless displays the sensitivity of markets to political phenomena. This, in turn, 
highlights the importance of the causal relationship, postulated in this study, running from the 
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nature of the political system or "democracy" to the ability to benefit from or hurt by 
financial globalization and capital flows.  
 
6 Overcoming the Democratic Deficit and the Resulting Cycles of Economic Populism 
 
Our analysis suggests that the benefits of financial globalization are crucially dependent on 
overcoming the democratic deficit and the resulting cycles of economic populism. This in 
turn raises the question of how a stalemate of this nature could be overcome. To provide an 
answer to this question and explore prospects for change, one needs to investigate three sets 
of actors in the Turkish context. These include political parties, civil initiatives originating 
from non-governmental organizations and external actors such as the European Union, or 
international financial institutions. 
 
Political parties constitute the least likely avenue for change in the Turkish setting. Recent 
research on political parties in Turkey demonstrates quite conclusively that these 
organizations tend to be leader dominated clientelistic networks. They tend to be organized in 
a highly hierarchical manner, a structure, which offers a disproportionate influence to the 
leader with little or no room for intra-party opposition.
31 The exceptional durability of party 
leadership and the clear absence of intra-party democracy tend to block any kind of change in 
the direction of greater transparency and accountability. Not surprisingly, political parties, in 
such an environment, are primarily concerned with the distribution of public resources among 
their own supporters. Their narrowly based short-term electoral focus prevents them from 
adopting a longer-term perspective and concentrating their attention on policies, which pay 
dividends only over a certain period of time.  
                                                        
31 On the nature of political parties in Turkey, see Heper and Landau (1991) and Kalaycioglu (2001), Turan 
(1995).   23
 
Whilst political parties are unlikely to assume a leadership role in the process of establishing 
a more accountable and transparent state, they are increasingly pressurized both from "above 
and below" by other actors such as supranational or international agencies and civil society 
organizations. A powerful "external anchor" often provides a major impetus for change in 
societies, where the practice of economic populism is highly entrenched. The experience of 
Mexico under NAFTA constitutes a clear testimony in favor of this observation.
32 Mexico 
was able to undertake difficult policy reforms and overcome domestic political resistance to 
reforms by utilizing the prospects of NAFTA membership and its associated benefits in the 
form of trade expansion and large inflows of foreign capital. Similar observations can be 
made in the case of the first wave of Mediterranean enlargement involving Greece, Portugal 
and Spain during the 1980's and the latest wave of "eastern enlargement" of the European 
Union, particularly in the cases of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
33 The 
transformation of Greece during the 1990s under the pressure of conforming to Maastricht 
criteria and the complying with requirements of entry into the European Monetary Union is 
particularly striking.
34 In the Turkish context, the EU anchor has been only partially effective. 
During the 1990s, Turkey has been integrated into the European Space through the Customs 
Union arrangement, which arguably forms a limited avenue for integration falling 
considerably short of full membership.
35 The implementation of the Customs Union 
agreement, since the beginning of 1996, exercised a powerful influence in terms of 
accelerating trade liberalization and regulatory reforms in Turkey. However, the positive 
impact of Customs Union was far more limited in comparison with the impetus provided to 
                                                        
32 For an analysis of Mexico under NAFTA, see Aspe (1993). 
33 For evidence on EU's southern and eastern enlargements and the positive consequences on the countries 
involved, see Preston (1997). 
34 On the transformation of Greece under the impact of EU pressures, though with a time lag of a decade, during 
the course of the 1990s, see Preston (1997) and OECD (1998).  
35 For evidence on the Customs Union agreement and its immediate impact, see Balkir (1998).   24
the Mediterranean trio in the 1980s and the post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The 
mix of conditions and incentives facing Turkey under the Customs Union agreement can be 
considered rather unfavorable.
 36 Turkey faced rather tough political conditions in terms of 
qualifying for EU financial assistance, which has been missing during the period under 
consideration in sharp contrast to the experiences of other actual and potential late entrants. 
 
The recent decision of the European council to include Turkey as a candidate country for EU 
membership constitutes a critical turning point in this context. Indeed, the Helsinki decision 
provided a favorable environment for the December 1999 Stabilization program. The impetus 
coming from EU will be of key importance for the prospects of overcoming democratic 
deficit and the resulting cycles of economic populism in Turkey during the course of the next 
decade. Arguably however, the unfavorable mix of conditions and incentives, which applied 
to the Customs Union in the first place, continues to characterize relations with the EU in the 
post-Helsinki era. This, in turn, strengthens the hand of the anti-reform coalition in Turkey, 
slowing down the momentum of change, instigated by the EU. 
 
The second powerful arm of the external anchor operating in the Turkish case involves the 
international financial community, as represented by its key institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Such institutions have every incentive to engineer an improvement in an 
economy like Turkey for three main reasons. First, they have a short-term incentive to 
recover the loans extended previously. Second, as a typical emerging market, Turkey 
constitutes a favorable market from a global trade and investment perspective. Finally, in a 
global financial environment characterized by "herd-behavior" and the resulting contagion, 
disciplining relatively poor performance becomes an over-riding objective. Similar incentives 
                                                        
36 On the inappropriate mix of conditions and incentives facing Turkey in its relations with EU, see Onis (2001).   25
exist in the case of EU as well since the EU will naturally benefit from the improved 
performance, both economic and political, of a potential member.     
 
Turning our attention to pressures from below, we witness significant growth in civil 
initiatives notably originating from the business community in recent years. In fact, external 
influences and domestically based civil initiatives are inherently interlinked. The increasing 
interest in and pressure for reform in the direction of greater transparency and accountability 
on the part of the business community, at large, and big business, in particular, has been 
heavily influenced by the need to conform to both the EU and the broader global norms.
37 
The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) has been particularly 
vocal in recent years in its plea for "democratization" with an explicit focus on the creation of 
an accountable and transparent state.
38 Whilst TUSIAD has been the primary actor in this 
context, other key business associations have followed its lead.
39 The collective long-term 
interests of the business community and especially the component of the business community 
integrated in to the world markets favor reform along the lines suggested. Yet a major 
qualification is called for in the sense that large number of individual businesses continue to 
be embedded in traditional clientelistic networks benefiting from particularistic access to 
state patronage. This in turn constitutes a counter force, limiting the momentum of change 
originating from the business community in the Turkish context. 
 
Civil initiatives in Turkey, in recent years, are not confined to the business community. 
Indeed, a series of recurrent civil initiatives can be identified in the latter half of the 1990s. 
                                                        
37 On the relationship between business and democracy in Turkey, in the recent era from a critical perspective, 
see Onis and Turem (2001). 
38 TUSIAD has published a number of reports in this context, among which TUSIAD (1995) and TUSIAD 
(1997) have been among the most influential.   26
The most striking examples of such initiatives include the plea for more open and transparent 
society initiated as a reaction to the Susurluk incident
40 and the civil initiatives flourished 
following the Earthquake of August 1999. Both of these initiatives represented a reaction to 
the undemocratic nature of the state and the inadequacy of state response to popular demands. 
More recently, civil initiatives against corruption have been particularly pronounced with 
some results in the direction of greater accountability.  
 
In spite of these favorable developments, however, one needs to recognize that the 
development of the civil society is in its infancy. Added to this, one also ought to 
acknowledge that civil society in Turkey tends to be highly fragmented and characterized by 
weak horizontal links, resulting in incoherence and limiting the impact of pressures from 
below. The business associations, in particular, tend to be quite elitist in their approach and 
refrain themselves from entering into broader alliance with other segments of civil society. 
This is perhaps not a paradox in a society, which is characterized by wide asymmetries in the 
distribution of power resources and pervasive relative income inequality. Hence, one should 
not overestimate the magnitude and speed of change originating from civil society, given the 
existing nature of the civil society itself and the highly entrenched interests, which continue 






                                                                                                                                                                            
39 A number of other business associations in Turkey have also been pushing for a more transparent and 
accountable state, as part of a broader program of democratization in recent years. Among the business 
organizations, active in this respect, are MUSIAD, TIM, TOBB and TUGIAD.    27
7 Conclusions: Broader Lessons and the Ramifications of the Turkish Experience 
 
Variations in economic performance, in the era of financial globalization, are increasingly 
dictated by differential domestic capacity to adjust to global norms. Countries with low 
domestic capacity for adjustment are typically states, which display significant democratic 
deficits. Weak democracies tend to experience recurrent populist cycles in the neo-liberal era 
and hence fail to benefit from the process of financial globalization. In fact, financial 
globalization tends to magnify the populist cycles and at the same time, renders these cycles 
increasingly more asymmetric in nature. Relatively mild up turns of the populist boom may 
be followed by severe downturn of the cycle, reflecting the impact of the crisis itself as well 
as the deflationary impact of the stabilization program, which follows. Each severe downturn 
of the populist cycles is in turn characterized by an increasingly more regressive income 
distributional profile. Such economies face the inherent danger of entering into and 
subsequently not being able to break away from "low-level equilibrium trap" involving low 
growth-high inequality. These broad observations have considerable relevance for explaining 
the behavior and performance of the Turkish economy during the post 1989 capital account 
liberalization era. 
 
Three key elements are highlighted in the present study. Firstly, contrary to the emphasis in 
the literature, our approach involves endogenizing the impact of the capital flows, with the 
nature of the political system or democracy, considered as the determining influence. 
Secondly, what on the surface appear to be short-term crises of liquidity, are diagnosed as 
resulting from the existence of deeper structural influences brought about by the democratic 
deficit. Finally, it is argued that an escape form the so-called low-level equilibrium trap is 
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quite possible over time due to a combination of external and domestically induced pressures, 
which tend to enforce one another. Hence, the existence of democratic deficit should not be 
viewed as a permanent stalemate since powerful incentives exist on the part of the key 
domestic and external actors to move in direction of greater compliance with global norms. A 
key implication of our analysis the speed and magnitude of escape are heavily dependent on 
the signals provided by external actors as well as the coherence and intensity of the initiatives 
emanating from the civil society. It is quite clear, for example, that clear and consistent 
signals in the form of a more balanced mix of conditions and incentives provided by the EU, 
is likely to perform a catalytic effect in the case of a country like Turkey. Indeed the powerful 
signals provided by the EU are likely to empower civil initiatives in challenging entrenched 
clientelistic networks characterizing the operations of the state. 
 
From a broader comparative perspective, our fundamental conclusions are the following. 
Financial crises during the recent era are typically concentrated in semi-periphery or 
emerging markets, countries that are typically characterized by weak democracies or 
democratic deficits. This suggests that there is a serious systemic need to strengthen and 
deepen democracy in the developing world. Since this objective is not easy to accomplish, 
serious question marks can be raised concerning the desirability of early exposure to financial 
globalization considering the current state of the world. Stated somewhat differently, the real 
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